Social Preference and Governance: A Case Study in India by Dinda, Soumyananda
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Social Preference and Governance: A
Case Study in India
Soumyananda Dinda
Department of Economics, University of Burdwan, India
February 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75828/
MPRA Paper No. 75828, posted 26 December 2016 14:23 UTC
0 
 




Department of Economics, Golapbag Campus,  
University of Burdwan,  
West Bengal,  
India 







This study investigates the relationship between social choice and fiscal performance in India since 
1991. Social choice is simple measurement in public affair activities like participating in election. 
Vote turnover in a democracy is taken to measure trust on institution. Social trust is considered as a 
proxy of social capital. Truly, the percentage vote turnover is the measurement of the level of citizens’ 
chance to express their preferences, which certainly help to increase governmental responsibility and 
accountability and thereby government performance. Here, the government is forced to be responsive 
to citizens’ preferences and the underlying social contract rule, which leads to a higher level of fiscal 
discipline. Using principal component analysis we construct social capital index that captures both 
structural and cultural aspects. Fiscal institution in India becomes weak in the post reform era. Group 
of politicians are much more interest about their local or regional issues than national issues even they 
are not interested to formulate regional development policy through discussion in the Parliament of 
India. Here higher value of social index indicates higher level of social trust as proxy of higher social 
capital. High social capital inversely affects the fiscal performance.  
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In a democratic system, generally, citizens (or voters) delegate the power to their 
representative agents to form a government and conduct social welfare functioning through 
selecting appropriate public or/and fiscal policy. Fiscal performance is the key indicator to 
judge the activity of the government and also a mirror image of the performance of 
representative agents. Here two aspects – (i) the principal–agent relationship1 between voters 
(the principals) and politicians (the agents), and (ii) the common pool problem of public 
finances, are important for the conduct of fiscal policy. Governments all over the world are 
concerned with efficiency in public service provision. All governance systems confront the 
tension between short term political interests, often dictated by electoral cycles, and the 
longer term need for fiscal stability and service delivery in line with governments’ stated 
policy priorities. Recent time, there is growing interest in how political and institutional 
factors affect fiscal performance at national (Roubini and Sachs 1989, Alesina and Perotti 
1996, 1997; Poterba 1996, Strauch and Hagen 2000, Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002) and local 
levels (Dafflon 2002, Hagen and Vabo 2005).  
There is a need to analyse the performance of political agents and institutions in India. These 
institutions are particularly important for fiscal policy decisions as fiscal institutions create 
the environment, the incentives, the rules, the regulations and the constraints under which 
budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented. Fiscal institutions promote fiscal discipline 
through proper design. Sometime an institutional framework (that results in soft budget 
constraints) provides incentives for loose fiscal discipline. These rules greatly vary over state 
governments that reflect state choice.    
Here, we should mentioned major difference between quantitative and procedural institutions 
(Buchanan 1980). Quantitative rules entail tax and expenditures limitation laws, debt brakes 
and other formal restraints to balance the budget. Empirical observation of Bohn and Inman 
(1996), Poterba (1997) or Shadbegian (1998) suggest that the budget rules support the fiscal 
discipline of policy makers. Procedural institutions define how property rights over political 
decisions are acquired, and assign authority to exercise them. Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
observed that the constitutional design of the regime type and the electoral rules crucially and 
significantly shape the fiscal policy decisions. 
However, it is impossible to design a constitution to establish a framework of quantitative 
and procedural institutions that answers all future questions of a society. So, there is certain 
degree of uncertainty. Hence trust becomes a crucial aspect. Mutual trust in the case of 
uncertainty reduces transaction costs and makes the institution to work smoothly (Putnam et 
al 1993, Putnam 2000; Fukuyama 1995). Trust is one of the most important and highly 
significant components of a social institution. Here, trust is the social capital of a society and 
plays the most important role in fiscal policy decisions.  
This study concentrates on the relationship between fiscal deficit and trust in the government 
using the sample of major Indian states over the period 1991-2012. We measure trust in two 
ways (i) as the percentage vote turnover during general election in India, i.e., trust in 
institution and measuring the level of citizens’ chance to express their preferences, (ii) as the 
percentage of vote share of the winning party with their seat share compare to second largest 
party, i.e., trust on political agents. Citizens vote according to their choice as per the political 
                                                          
1 The principal agent problem refers to a situation in which the principal relies on the agent to perform an action 
which is in the principal’s interest, but that is costly to the agent. If there is information asymmetry and the 
principal cannot effectively monitor the agent, the agent would have an incentive to behave opportunistically. 
For instance voters elect politicians to act in their interests, but politicians may instead act in their own personal 
interests. Similarly civil servants may act in their own interests rather than in that of their political head. The 
problem of the principle is to design an incentive regime that aligns the interest of the agent with that of the 
principle, so that the agent – acting in her own interest – will carry out the wishes of the principal. 
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agenda forwarded by political parties. The highest seat sharing party form the government 
and second largest party becomes opposition or runner. Vote turnovers certainly help to 
increase governmental responsibility and accountability. It is true that the government is 
forced to be responsive to citizens’ preferences and the underlying social contract rule, which 
leads to a higher level of fiscal discipline. Our hypothesis states that more trust in 
government, measured as the electoral support of winner’s agenda is a signal for a stronger 
social cohesion between the government and the electorate, which in turn results in strong 
fiscal policy decisions.  
 
Literature Review 
The concept of social capital evolves over time2 and it has been defined in several ways. 
Social capital is the network of objective relationships (structural dimension) that people and 
organizations have, and subjective relationships (cognitive dimension) that linked to norms 
and trust in other people and organizations. Initially the social organization is considered as 
social capital, ‘facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence 
or could be achieved only at a higher cost’ (Coleman (1990)). Putnam et al (1993) provide 
similar characterization referring to ‘the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, 
and networks that can improve the efficiency of society’. In their view, social capital is a 
positive group externality that arises from social organization/institution. Whereas Fukuyama 
(1995) argues for certain shared norms and values that assure ‘the meeting of obligation and 
reciprocity’. Putnam (2000) introduces the idea of social capital in terms of ‘connections 
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that 
arise from them.’ At individual level social capital also refers to a system of interpersonal 
networks (Dasgupta 2002), which enhances cooperation and collaboration that helps also to 
create the economic opportunities. Social capital might be considered as ‘resources embedded 
in social networks and accessed and used by actors for actions’ (Lin 2001). Social capital can 
be considered as the stock of active connections among individuals and also helps to resolve 
collective problems easily in the form of ‘cooperative action’ (Cohen and Prusak 2001).  
The concept of social capital has two important components: (i) it represents resources 
embedded in social relations rather than individuals, and (ii) access and use of such resources 
reside with actors. Thus, social capital creates a common platform in which individuals can 
use membership and networks to secure benefits3. Social capital is the shared knowledge, 
understanding, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of 
individuals bring to a recurrent activity (Ostrom 2000). Social capital is usually understood as 
referring to the values and norms prevailing within the community, to the networks that are 
based on those values and norms, and to the social trust that evolves through those common 
values and networks. Actually, social capital allows individuals to resolve collective 
problems more easily and individuals often might be better off if they cooperate, with 
everybody doing her/his own work4. Social capital (at individual level) also refers to a system 
                                                          
2 Truly the concept of social capital has a long history in the social sciences. The concept of social capital has 
been developed primarily in the subjects of sociology and political science. It has become popular in several 
fields of policymaking and research. Bourdieu (1980, 1986), Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995, 
2000) are credited for introducing the concept of social capital and popularized it.  
3 Individuals are engaged in repeated interactions with others in everyday business, thereby, social transactions 
are less costly.  
4 Society obviously allows individual to act in certain ways and only within a collectively defined and supported 
area of freedom. Social capital has also been used to refer to the social and cultural capacity of individuals. 
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of interpersonal networks5 (Dasgupta 2002), which enhances cooperation and collaboration 
that also helps to create the economic opportunities.  
Most important feature of social capital is the symbolism of capital6 as an economic 
metaphor. According to McGonigal et al. (2005) social capital is a form of power, a 
‘resource’: it can be utilized, traded, exchanged, and invested. Social capital concerns the 
relationships among people with differential power and allows access to resources7, 
information and knowledge within a community or groups. Social capital is a capacity, and/or 
a facility that can, deploy and activated towards some desired goal. Thus, social capital is 
purposeful; a means toward other ends (McGonigal et al. 2005).  
Social capital generates economic effects for its proprietors, whereby it is, unlike other types 
of capital, not embodied in respective individuals, but rather in relations between them8; thus, 
it cannot be appropriated by any one individual. Consequently, it does not benefit solely those 
who generate it, but also brings utility to those that do not take part in the process of its 
creation; thus, the free-rider problem arises, with certain individuals avoiding responsibility 
for the social capital's reproduction. Social capital is a public good and is thus subject to 
externalities. According to many authors, social capital prevents opportunism, encourages 
cooperation, decreases transaction costs9, lowers the possibility of disputes, drives transfer of 
knowledge and increases solidarity (Fukuyama, 1995; Collier, 1998).  
The growing literature claims that repeating trustful interactions in the economy do sediment 
in higher levels of generalized trust, which is aggregated stock of trust. Scholars like Miguel 
(2003), Mogues and Carter (2005), Rupasingha et al. (2006) study the relationship between 
the stock of social capital and its relation to economic development, especially, low crime 
rates and reduction of other social problems. It should also be noted that countries/regions 
with relatively higher stocks of social capital, in terms of generalized trust and widespread 
civic engagement seem to achieve higher levels of growth, compared to societies with low 
trust (Putnam et al. 1993). So, social capital contributes to economic growth by focusing the 
importance of trust and cooperation within firm, industry, market and the state. Thus, social 
capital truly greases the wheels that allow nations to advance smoothly and creates the base 
for economic prosperity. Economic development of a nation depends on the impact of social 
capital which includes social culture, social norms and regulations that promote economic 
reforms and development activities. Social capital in the sense of trust among members of a 
civil society and social cohesion fosters the working of government institutions.  
                                                          
5 The ‘effort of sociability’ (Bourdieu), the ‘general level of trustworthiness’ (Coleman), and the operational of 
‘norms, trust and reciprocity’ (Putnam), - all these highlight the domain of interpersonal conduct (McGonigal et 
al. 2005). 
6 There has been a great deal of scepticism towards using the concept of capital for social capital among certain 
prominent representatives of the discipline of economics (for example Solow (1997 and 2000; Arrow 2000; and 
Dasgupta 2000). However, other leading economists have accepted the concept, incorporated it into economic 
concept terminology, and attempted to measure it and evaluate its importance. Becker (1996) has treated from a 
theoretical point of view social capital as a variable where the utility for the individual is concerned. Moreover, 
several studies (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2004), Bjornskov (2006), 
Glaeser et al. (2000), Alesina and Ferrara (2002), Miguel (2003), Knack et al. (1997), Sobel (2002), Tau (2003), 
Temple and Johson (1998), etc.) have discussed about the features of social capital and economic performance. 
Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and Johnson (1998) provide the evidences that high levels of trust and social 
participation are positively correlated with economic growth, after controlling other growth promoting factors. 
7 Social capital can also be exploited (McGonigal et al. 2005). 
8 The concept of social capital, in sociology, has constantly been present as a concept that stresses the 
importance of relations. It emphasises on the word "capital", indicating that relations comprise a value 
component that can become a source of competitive advantage. 
9 A falling level of social capital increases the level of distrust, decreases mutual cooperation, causes growth of 
crime rates, decreases the number of weddings, increases the number of separations and fosters alienation in 
neighbourhoods, thus strongly increasing transaction costs (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995). 
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Social trust is one of the key concepts in the social science. Researchers (Knack and Keefer 
1997, Zak and Knack 2001, Beugelsdijk et al 2004 etc.) observe the positive relationship 
between economic growth and social trust. Interactions among citizens build up social trust. 
Interaction between trust (thought of as an individual behaviour) and public policy seems to 
be important to increase the effectiveness of fiscal performance10. In this study we propose 
one of the fundamental reasons focusing on the country specific quality of informal 
institutions. Social capital refers to the notion of informal institutions which is a proxy of the 
level of generalized trust. Trust is one of the most important dimensions of social capital 
(Fukuyama 1995, Knack and Zak 2002) and literature proxies the level of social capital using 
the level of generalized trust (used world value survey data). 
Concept of social capital and functioning of democracy: The notion of social capital as an 
important determinant of economic development has gained momentum since 1990s. 
Coleman (1988) and Putnam et al (1993) introduced and popularised the concept of social 
capital, and now it is commonly defined as generalized trust (Beugelsdijk and Maseland 
2011). Social capital is described as the willingness to trust others without expectation of 
immediate reciprocity (Whiteley 2000). In a sense, social capital is presented as a form of 
informal institution, having an impact on the trajectory of the economy. Social capital acts as 
a complement to the presence of formal institution and as substitute where formal institutions 
are at an early stage of development. So, a high level of prevailing social capital will 
discourage politicians to act opportunistically. In economic literature, the interrelationship 
between social capital, political regimes and economic performance has not been examined 
thoroughly. Boix and Posner (1998) argue that along with between–agents cooperation, social 
capital enhances the performance of governments and institutions. They argue as high level 
social capital leads to rational voters who punish underperforming governments. A rational 
electorate will have preferences that will enforce civic virtue, which is described as a shift 
from particularized to common interest. Hence, we use the concept of social capital.  
There are different interests between low and high social capital agents – (i) low social 
capital agents have particularised interest leading to short term and personal focus; they will 
be interested in direct benefits such as public goods that they enjoy, or direct costs like the 
taxes that they pay, but at the same time they will highly discount generalised costs as 
amount of debt issued in order to provide the public goods at question.  (ii) on the other hand, 
high social capital agents will equally weight both personal and generalized costs.  
Citizens having low social capital will be more prone to accommodate a manipulation in the 
presence of asymmetric information. Both voters are rational and elect competent political 
agents. The competence is judged on the basis of the capability which is based on the amount 
of public goods the policy maker is able to provide but they penalize him for the cost as 
depicted on the level of taxes and the debt issued. However, low social capital voters highly 
discount the debt and pay more attention to direct benefits and cost. So, the incumbent will 
have an incentive to undertake fiscal expansion, either reduce taxes or increase public goods 
financed by issuing new debt, it actually depends on the ratio of low to high social capital 
voters in the society. 
Social Capital and Trust: Trust has been studies in different disciplines. It is an important 
concept in social sciences, enforcing the interdisciplinary social discourse among researchers. 
Concept of social capital is multidimensional and it emerges from different aspects of social 
                                                          
10 Information asymmetry hampers the proper functioning of markets, and its result is the market failure. 
‘Benevolent Government’ maximise social welfare and it can prevent market failure by providing public goods, 
for instance. Since information is asymmetry between government and citizens, it is difficult for citizens to 
evaluate the government’s activities. This leads politicians and bureaucrats to behave in a way that maximises 
self-interest. The government is forced to be efficient to maximise social welfare, resulting in economic growth, 
if citizens can obtain sufficient information about the government’s activities. 
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life. Figure 1 demonstrates the dimensions of social capital. Trust, is one important dimension 
of social capital, is the base on which a democratic system has built up in a country (see 
subcomponents of trust in figure 1). The work of Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) have 
renewed interest on it in the social basis of political and economic development. Putnam 
(1993) shows the importance of social capital for the effective governance in a democratic 
social system. According to Putnam (1993) social capital is the features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions. Many authors have singled out trust as an important feature 
of productive social relationships (see, e.g., Gambetta 1988, Hardin 1993, Dinda 2008). 
Sociologists have also intensively investigated the concept of social capital. Bourdieu (1980) 
and Coleman (1988, 1990) have strongly influenced the social capital literature focusing on 
individuals and small societal units. Portes and Mooney (2002) point out that social capital is 
the ability to secure resources by virtue of membership in social networks or larger social 
structures. Knack and Keefer (1997) investigated the impact of civic duty and trust on growth 
and investment rates in a cross section analysis. Knack and Keefer (1997) find a strong and 
significant positive relationship between social capital variables and economic growth. 
Looking at the public finance literature, Slemrod (1998) argues that the social capital derived 
from the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily lowers the cost of the operating government and 
of equitably assigning its cost to citizens. The World Bank is also focusing on social capital 
and investigating the practical relevance of this concept. 
There are several views on social capital (Grootaert 2001) at macroeconomic level: First, the 
concept developed by Putnam (1993) interpreting social capital as a social network, as 
networks of civic engagement facilitating coordination and cooperation. Second, Coleman’s 
(1988) approach defines social capital as “a variety of different entities”, consisting of some 
aspects of social structure and facilitating certain actions of actors. This allows taking into 
account not only horizontal but also vertical social relationships. Third concept considers the 
social and political environment that enforces norms and shapes social structures. 
Our investigation in this paper grounds basically on the third concept, which takes the more 
formalized institutional relationship between state and citizens at the vertical level into 
account. As trust is a multidimensional concept, we restrict our focus on a specific 
dimension: citizens’ political trust. This is in line with Rothstein (2003), who argues that the 
explanation of social capital is much more grounded in political instead of sociological 
variables. 
 








Government accountability can be seen as the most important aspect of trust with respect to 
fiscal performance. Engagement, involvement and participation in political and public issues 
by a large part of the electorate are an important feature to hold politicians and bureaucrats 
accountable. As the government is better aware of citizens’ preferences, policies will better 
reflect citizens’ needs (see, Boix and Posner 1998). It is reasonable to argue that a certain 
level of fiscal discipline can be seen as a proxy for governmental performance. Voter 
turnover rates help to increase governmental accountability, so that the government is forced 
to be responsive to citizens’ preferences and the underlying social contract rule of law at 
large, favouring a higher level of fiscal discipline. 
Social capital is a new field, suffering from a great lack of good, reliable data. Both time 
series and cross-country evidence are missing. Social capital is a promising concept, which 
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can be operationalized by relatively simple measurement. Vote turnover percent in the 
election in the democracy is taken to measure trust on political institutions. To measure 
mutual trust among citizen, their representatives and political institutions we also use the 
information from winning vote percentage share and runner up vote share. Our basic 
assumption is that electoral support to the agenda of winning political party, government 
proposals, reveals social trust on government (formed by winning party, or its associates). 
Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of trust. Fiscal 
performance is measured in terms of tax and nontax revenue, expenditure, and/or fiscal 
deficit (expenditure – revenue). This paper investigates the relationship between social capital 
(social trust) and fiscal performances using state level data in India. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Most of the data are collected from different departments of the government of India. 
Election data, institutional data, literacy, crime statistics and population data are taken from 
the Election commission of India, the Ministry of Parliamentary affair, Ministry of Human 
resource, Ministry of Home and Census, respectively. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and 
the Ministry of finance, government of India, are the main source of financial data. This study 
focuses on fiscal performance, which is measured in terms of revenue and expenditure 
and/or, surplus or deficit. As per RBI there are several definitions of deficits (See Appendix 
for detail). Following RBI deficits are measured as: (i) Revenue Deficit (RD) denotes the 
difference between revenue receipts and revenue expenditure, (ii) Gross Fiscal Deficit (GFD) 
is the difference between aggregate disbursements net of debt repayments and recovery of 
loans and revenue receipts and non-debt capital receipts, (iii) Capital Deficit denotes the 
difference between capital receipts and capital disbursements, (iv) Net Fiscal Deficit (NFD) 
is the gross fiscal deficit less net lending of the State Governments, (v) Gross Primary Deficit 
(GPD) is defined as GFD minus interest payments, etc. 
Measuring Social Capital 
Basically, two approaches can be discussed in the conceptualization of social capital as a 
characteristic of communities. In the first, social capital is defined using aggregate-level data 
on, say, the density of voluntary organizations or rates of political participation. The second 
strategy relies on aggregated individual-level survey data. As data availability precludes the 
inclusion of survey-based indices at local level (Municipality and Panchayat), we follow the 
former approach in our analysis and use only macro-indicators for the measurement of social 
capital. Specifically, three different indicators are used. 
Our first indicator of social capital measures associational life. We include this variable, as a 
wide interlocking web of formal organizations refers to a high level of social capital. 
Voluntary associations are seen as creators of social capital because of their socialization 
effects on democratic and cooperative values and norms. Moreover, the trust and norms of 
reciprocity that people generate in associations are spread over the whole community, 
encompassing citizens who are not equally active in associational life (Stolle, 2000). We use 
a wide variety of organizations (per capita) in each state to measure the density of 
associational activity. In this study we use average household size in each state. Household 
size is an indicator of basic minimum socio-economic associational life. Household is the 
basic social unit for economic and political activity. Average size of household is 5, and it 
ranged from 3 to 8 in India.  
In a democratic system, household members (citizens or voters) delegate the power to the 
elected politicians to form a government and conduct fiscal performance selecting proper 
public policy. Representative political agents generally form the government and take 
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decision related to public policy. Hence, vote turnover is an important variable for us. In 
correspondence with Casey (2004), Costa and Kahn (2003), Putnam (2000), and Serra 
(1999), we use electoral turnout in the general elections as a second indicator of social 
capital. This is measured as the number of votes cast on Election Day (valid as well as 
invalid) divided by the number of registered voters. It refers to civic involvement and 
participation in public affairs. Turnout rates ranged from 23.5% to 92.8% in the election 
under study and thus show significant variation between the states in India. This significant 
variation in actual turnout rates allow us to interpret high turnout levels as signalling an 
engagement toward the ‘‘common good’’ and thus a high level of social capital (see also 
Overbye, 1995). The extent of associational life and electoral turnout are indicators that cover 
the structural component of social capital in India.  
Fukuyama (1995), Inglehart (1997), and Putnam (1993) have suggested that social norms, but 
in particular trust among citizens, establish the cultural aspects of social capital. Education 
level is a good indicator of cultural dimension of general social capital, hence, we may 
consider average literacy rate as indicator of social capital. Literacy rate generates social trust 
and development. There is also an antitrust, negative side of the society. As Delhey and 
Newton (2004) have shown that distrust accompanies conflict, the crime rate can be 
conceived as an indicator for the level of generalized trust within a state and thus as an 
objective proxy for the attitudinal (or cultural) component of social capital. Hence, and 
thereby following Rice and Sumberg (1997), the crime rate in each state is used as our third 
indicator of social capital. Clearly, as crime in societies will lower citizens’ respect and trust 
in one another, low crime rates are expected to be indicative of a high level of social capital. 
The above three indicators are expected to be measuring a similar underlying concept of 
social capital. Hence, we combine them into a single index through a factor analysis using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as the method of extraction. This mitigates the 
influence of idiosyncratic measurement error within each of the variables and maximizes the 
likelihood of measuring the underlying concept more precisely. Thus, even though the 
individual indicators of social capital are arguably less than ideal and their choice might be 
criticized, the component retrieved from the PCA analysis ‘‘probably measures social capital 
better than any single indicator’’ (Bjørnskov, 2003; see also Knack, 2002; Rice & Sumberg, 
1997).  
 
Data Analysis   
Primary Observations 
Table 1 describes the summary statistics of major variables. Vote turnover rate varies widely 
from 24% to 92% in both the Lok Sabha and the Bidhan Sabha. Average vote turnover rates 
are 61.28% and 69.81% in Lok Sabha and Bidhan Sabha, respectively. So, more than 60% 
voters trust on political institutions (Assembly and Parliament). On an average vote 
percentage gap between the winner and runner is about 10%, but seat margin is around 46.  It 
should be noted that rejected vote is nearly 2% and its maximum value is 9.2%, which is very 
high. It can be interpreted that 2 percent people are not interested to reveal their choice 
preferences. Rejected vote may be a signal of distrust on political institution and its 
representatives. Average family size is 5. Average economic crime rate and literacy rate are 
6.91 and 72.29, respectively. 
 
Table 1: descriptive statistics of major variable of social capital during 1990-2013 
Variable  Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
9 
 
Vote turnover LS 614 61.28 12.12 25.68 91.77 
Vote turnover BS 612 69.81 11.14 23.82 91.82 
Winner Seats 612 81.58 58.1 16 224 
Winner Vote 612 37.6 8.998 18.75 71.09 
Runner Vote 603 27.54 8.99 7.88 49.27 
Voter rejected (%) 612 2.01 2.0 0 9.19 
Seat Margin 612 45.94 43.84 1 190 
Vote margin 612 10.47 11.77 -8.84 70.41 
Economic Crime rate 336 6.91 4.21 0.84 29.58 
Literacy rate 336 72.29 9.43 47 94.21 
Average Family Size 336 5.02 0.56 3.6 6.4 
 
 
This primary observation (Table 1) suggests that social trust is more on Assembly (Bidhan 
Sabha) than Parliament (Lok Sabha), reason behind it may be the dominating regional 
interest. Public choice preference is higher at regional level. As per election results the 
regional parties have emerged and form the government focusing on local issues. It indicates 
that public choice is high prefer to form the government at regional level rather than national 
level. So, the government at the Centre or national level become weak that is clearly observed 
in the performance of the Parliament of India and also performance of the member of the 
Parliament (MP). Number of the Ordinances has increased due to low performance of the 
Parliament in the post reform period. 
Trusts on Institutions 
Voters cast their votes to elect and send their representatives to the policy making institution. 
Here, voters reveal their trust on (i) institution and (ii) representatives. So, participation of 
voters in the election process is actually trust on the policy making institutions. Trust on 
institution is measured here as voter turnover rate (percentage). There are two types of 
policy-making institutions in national and state levels. Voter turnover in the parliamentary 
and assembly elections are the indicators of trust on national and state policy-making 
institutes, respectively. Here we first discuss trust on national policy-making institution, 
secondly on state or provincial policy- making institution, and finally, on local policy-making 
institutions. 
Trust on National policy-making Institution: Table 2 shows the trend of voter turnover rate in 
several general elections over the period of 1989-2014. Basically, Table 2 displays the trend 
of overall trust on policy making institution in India since 1989. Trust on the political 
institution in India is more or less fixed over long run with short run fluctuations. Overall 
national trust on institution can be decomposed into state levels. Trust on institution in the 
state levels are the voter turnover rates in a general election. Table 3 demonstrates the state-
wise trend of voter turnover rates during 1989-2014. It is clear that there is huge variation 
among states in the post liberalization period in India. So, State-wise trust on central policy 
making institution varies due to several socio-economic and political reasons. 
 
 
Table 2: Trend of voter turnover during 1989- 2014 
Election Year Registered Voters (Million) Voter turnover (%) 
1989 498.9 61.95 
1991 498.4 56.73 
1992# 13.2 23.96 
1996 592.6 57.94 
1998 605.9 61.97 
1999 619.5 59.99 
2004 671.5 57.98 
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2009 717.0 58.19 
2014 834.1 66.4 
Note:  #Elections were held separately for Punjab. 
Source: ECI publications & website: www.eci.nic.in 
 
 
Table 3: State-wise trend of vote turnover rate in LS election for period of 1989- 2014 
States 2014 2009 2004 1999 1996 1991 1989 
Andhra Pradesh 74.47 72.63 69.95 69.14 63.02 61.42 70.43 
Arunachal Pradesh 78.61 68.16 56.35 72.15 55.04 51.28 59.17 
Assam 79.88 69.53 69.11 71.26 78.5 75.25 
 Bihar 56.28 44.46 58.02 61.48 59.45 60.35 60.24 
Chhattisgarh 69.54 55.28 
     Goa 77.02 55.28 58.77 45.11 56.33 42.39 58.16 
Gujarat 63.6 47.9 45.18 47.03 35.92 44.01 54.58 
Haryana 71.41 67.49 65.72 63.68 70.48 65.84 64.41 
Himachal Pradesh 64.42 58.41 59.71 56.78 57.58 57.43 63.95 
Jammu & Kashmir 49.52 39.68 35.2 32.34 48.96 
 
25.68 
Jharkhand 63.87 50.98 
     Karnataka 67.17 58.81 65.14 67.58 60.22 54.81 67.53 
Kerala 73.89 73.36 71.45 70.19 71.11 73.32 79.3 
Madhya Pradesh 61.6 51.16 48.09 54.88 54.06 44.36 55.21 
Maharashtra 60.36 50.71 54.38 60.96 52.45 48.75 59.86 
Manipur 79.62 77.14 67.41 65.67 75.04 69.65 71.16 
Meghalaya 68.79 64.38 52.69 56.16 61.62 53.75 51.92 
Mizoram 61.69 51.8 63.6 65.31 73.41 58.64 58.26 
Nagaland 87.82 89.99 91.77 76.25 88.32 77.07 74.71 
Orissa 73.75 65.33 66.06 55.63 59.22 53.81 59.27 
Punjab 70.61 69.77 61.59 56.11 62.25 
 
62.67 
Rajasthan 63.09 48.4 49.97 53.86 43.4 47.25 56.53 
Sikkim 83.37 83.76 77.95 81.71 77.43 58.75 72.01 
Tamil Nadu 73.7 73.03 60.81 57.98 66.93 63.92 66.86 
Tripura 84.72 84.45 67.08 68.14 79.09 67.28 83.89 
Uttar Pradesh 58.35 47.78 48.16 53.53 46.5 49.24 51.27 
Uttarakhand 61.6 53.34 
     West Bengal 82.16 81.4 78.04 75.05 82.66 76.73 79.67 
NCT of Delhi 65.07 51.85 47.09 43.54 50.62 48.52 54.3 
Puducherry 82.1 79.81 76.07 63.27 75.35 67.71 66.71 
Source: ECI publications & website: www.eci.nic.in 
 
 
Performance of the Institution: Here, we use an index measuring the performance of the 
fiscal institution. Institution performance index is calculated as the ratio of actual government 
business days performed out of total session days in the year. Initially institution performance 
index slowly declines till mid 1990s and fluctuates in late 1990s but rises slowly during 
2000-2006, then a sudden huge fall in 2008 which was the lowest performance of the fiscal 
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institution since 1991 (see, Fig 2). Overall in the post reform period the performance of 
institution in terms of business days declines with fluctuation over time. Truly the 
performance of the institution is fully depends on performance of the government, which 
depends on the composition of political entities with their political agenda that is directly 
linked with representatives. Hence, we have to examine the performance of our 
representatives in the fiscal institution.  
 




Trusts on Representatives and their Performance: Performance of the representatives 
(Members of Parliament (MPs) or policy makers) in the fiscal institution, especially fiscal 
policy discussion during budget session in the Parliament of India is simply measured in 
terms of effort hours on budget discussion. Performance of representative is measured in 
terms of (a) demand for grants and (b) total time taken on budget discussion. Budget session 
is crucial for making fiscal policy in right direct in a democratic set up. Figure 3 and 4 
display the performance of representatives during the period of 1951-2012. Fig 3 shows that 
discussion on demand for grants has a sharp fall since 1990s. Total time taken is also 
drastically falls since 1990s. This indicates that representatives spend less time on public 
finance issues and thereby fiscal institution in India becomes weak. Group of politicians are 
much more interest about their local or regional issues than national issues even they are not 
interested to formulate regional development policy through discussion in the Parliament of 
India. In other way, we can argue that our representatives are performing their duty 
inefficiently for making public policy in the parliament effectively. 
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Fig 4 shows the trends of MP’s activity index since 1951. MP’s activity index is measured as 
the ratio of active participation to total budget discussion during budget sessions only. To 
capture the behaviour of MP’s activity related to fiscal policy formation we also study annual 
change of the MP’s activity index. Bottom part of the fig 4 shows the huge fluctuation of 
MP’s activity index since 1990s. There is high volatility in the performance indices of MP’s 
activity and also fiscal institution. Perhaps, Indian socio-economic system may be confused, 
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lok sabha. Main cause of this volatility is the emerging regional parties based on regional 
development issues. So, political pressure on the State and Central governments is rising over 
last few decades. Consequence of it, the government expenditure has increased more than 
revenue. Here, the fiscal deficit is the key indicator of the performance of the government.  
 
Fiscal Performance 
Fiscal performance of India is the performance of the government of India regarding 
collection of revenue and expenditure for a certain period. Here, we focus on the fiscal 
performance of India in terms of financial status of India in pre and post reform era. During 
1980-81 – 2012-13, the government expenditure is more than revenue, so, fiscal deficits play 
crucial role in India. Fiscal performance in India can be decomposed into the State and 
Central governments. Gross fiscal deficit (State and Central combined deficit) fluctuates over 
the period of 1981-82 to 2013-14. Figure 5, 6 and 7 display the trends of fiscal performance 
of India.  In the post reform period, gross fiscal deficit has reached at the maximum and 
minimum level in 2001-02 and 2008-09, respectively (see, Fig 5). Movement of revenue 
deficit over time is very much similar to that of gross fiscal deficit. Primary deficit declines in 
the post reform period and become negative in 2008-9. Fiscal deficit is positive and high, but 
it starts to decline sharply during 2001-2 – 2008-9. It is good indication for the economy.  
Fig 5: Combined Deficit (% of GDP) of Centre and State Governments since 1980-81. 
 
 
The government of India, the policymaker, has taken several development projects to provide 
public goods for improving public welfare. These development projects are funded from 
loans or debts – internal as well as external. Hence, we also observe that the fiscal deficit is 
strongly connected with debt. Figure 6 and 7 show the trends of financial liabilities of the 
government during 1980-81 – 2012-13. Consequence of fiscal deficit, debt burden (measured 
as % of GDP) has increased during 1980-81 – 2012-13 (Fig 6).  Figure 6 displays the trend of 
total liabilities (or debt percentage of GDP) of Centre and State governments during 1980-81 
02012-13. Central liabilities were high in 1990-91 and in 2004-5. Total liabilities of both 














Fig 6: Debt (% of GDP) of Centre and State Governments during 1980-81 – 2012-13. 
 
 
Domestic liabilities of the government (both State and Central Govt.) are increasing in post 
reform period while external liabilities have sharply declined since 1991 (Fig 7). Figure 7 
displays both domestic and external liabilities of central government during 1981-82 – 2013-
14. From Fig 7, it is clear that domestic liabilities of the central government reach at 
maximum in 2004-5 and after that it starts to decline. Now, external liabilities of the 
government of India are approaching towards zero, which suggest that external burden of 
India is the minimum and India is getting out of financial dependency structure in the global 
arena. It is a clear signal that India is gaining self reliance and economic power in the world. 
 
Fig 7: Domestic and External debts of Central Govt during 1980-81 – 2013-14 
 
 
Social Capital Index 
Social capital is a concept of multidimensional. To capture multifaceted features or 
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Major components of social capital variables are assigned weight using principal component 
analysis. The results of the Principal Component Analysis are summarized in Table 4. The 
absolute value of the component loadings of all three indicators is above the critical value of 
0.35 (Pennings, Keman, & Kleinnijenhuis, 1999). Hence, each of the elements loads 
powerfully onto one underlying component extracted from the data. Note also that with the 
use of all three indicators into one principal component, our index of social capital comprises 
both structural aspects (i.e., associational life including political involvement) and a cultural 
aspect (i.e., the crime rate as a proxy for social trust). Hence, our social capital index takes 
account of the dual nature of the concept. Using the component loading weight we have 
calculated social capital index (Table 4). 
Table 4: Social Capital Component 
A: SCindex 
Component Measure Component Loading  
Vote turnover 0.5729 
Econ Crime rate -0.1601 
Avg (min)Association size -0.583 
Literacy rate 0.5534 
  
Eigenvalue 1.76948 
Percentage variation  44.24 
Note: SCindex is generated using above weights.  
B: SC 
Component Measure Component Loading  
Vote turnover (LS) 0.6113 
Vote turnover (BS) 0.6032 
Econ Crime rate -0.2701 
A.F. Size [Association size] -0.4352 
  
Eigenvalue 2.1063 
Percentage variation  52.66 
Note: SC is generated using above weights. 
C: SCC 
Component Measure Component Loading  
Vote turnover (LS) 0.6754 
Vote turnover (BS) 0.6219 
Econ Crime rate -0.3040 
  
Eigenvalue 1.8478 
Percentage variation  61.59 
Note: SCC is generated using above weights. 
 
In this study we are focusing on major dimension of social capital such as associational life, 
cultural life etc. Major components of social capital are average household size, vote 
turnover, literacy and crime rate. Single social capital index is formulated assigning weights, 
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which are taken from principal component analysis (see Table 4). Vote turnover rate and 
literacy rate indicate social preference of public goods through public policy in discussion.  
Family size and crime rate assign negative value to social capital index. Family size is the 
proxy of associational life which has negative contribution to social capital index. Table 4 
presents all possible combination of major component of social capital index. Among our 
major indicators of social capital vote turnover rate carries higher weight compare to other 
indicators. Negative value is associated with crime rate. It is justified because more crime rate 
indicates less trust prevails in the society – it is also indicate the antitrust to social 
development and also reveals the law and order situation or weak government and institution. 
 
Results and Discussion  
Table 5 and Table 6 describe the impact of the major components of social capita on revenue 
generation which is a vital component of fiscal performance. Revenue source of the states are 
mainly own tax and own nontax. Vote turnover rate is highly significant but its impact on 
revenue collection is different and in opposite direction, i.e., own tax revenue falls as vote 
turnover increases while own nontax revenue rises. It indicates that higher social (trust) 
capital reduces own tax (or direct tax) revenue. Crime rate has also positive impact on it. This 
suggests that as crime rate increases social general trust is reduced thereby social capital 
declines which forced to increase both tax and nontax revenues. More associational life 
reduces tax revenues whereas literacy rate has positive impact on it. ONTR declines with 
increasing population density and also with seat margin. 
Table 5: Major dimensions of social capital and revenue performance 
Variables OTRGSDP ONTRGSDP 




























   
R2 0.2252 0.0488 
N 180 180 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote  
the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Components of social capital are replaced by social capital index and repeat the exercise and 
results are presented in Table 6. Combining major social dimensions all types of social 
capital index has indirect effect on tax revenue but direct effect on nontax revenue in India. 
Table 6 provides the results of social capital index (SCindex, SC and SCC) and revenue 
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performance. Here, higher value of social index indicates higher level of social trust as proxy 
of higher social capital. So, more social capital suggests less direct tax burden however more 
nontax revenues.  
 
Table 6: Social Capital Index and Revenue performance 
A 
 OTRGSDP ONTRGSDP 
















R2 0.056 0.0281 
B 

























   
R2 0.3209 0.1362 
Adj R2 0.3007 0.1105 
N 174 174 
C 





.... .... ... 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote  





Table 7 presents panel data estimated fiscal deficit. We compare results of pooled and 
random effect model in panel data analysis. Social capital determines fiscal deficit directly. 
Seat margin in the general election has also strong direct impact on determining fiscal deficit. 




Table 7: Panel data estimated [Pooled & Random Effect] results of fiscal deficit 
 
Variables  OLS (pooled)  RE (Random effect)  
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R2  0.1045  0.0909  
R2 (between)   0.2311  
R2 (within)   0.004  
N  335  335  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote  
the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 8 presents the estimated results of selected few fiscal indicators as percentage of gross 
state domestic product. Major fiscal variables are own tax revenue (OTR), own nontax 
revenue (ONTR), interest payment (IP), Non development revenue (NDR), etc.  Vote margin 
has direct impact on all the variables except own tax revenue (OTR). So, politically social 
trust improves nontax revenue, interest payment, pension, custom tax and non development 
revenues.  
 
Table 8: OLS estimated results of selected few fiscal indicators measured in % of GSDP 
 





























































































       
R2 0.2759 0.3700 0.2828  0.3427 0.2813 0.4138 
Adj.R2 0.2508 0.3481 0.2579 0.3198 0.2564 0.3935 
N 180 180 180 179 180 180 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote the level of significance  
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Result of interest payment is also increases with vote margin which is unexpected. Income 
level is also important for all the fiscal variables. Tax revenue increases with per capita state 
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gdp which has indirect impact on interest payment, pension, custom tax and non-develop 
revenue. Average family size has direct effect on IP, PN, CT and NDR but indirect effect on 
OTR. So, associational life adversely affects direct tax while it favours IP, PN, CT and NDR. 
Literacy rate also behaves similar to associational life. 
Tax revenue (both OTR & ONTR) increases with rising crime rate. In other word, tax 
revenue increases if social capital is low (i.e., crime rate increases in the society). Non 
development revenue increases with vote margin, literacy rate and average size of 
associational life. Vote margin, literacy rate and average associational life directly affect on 
interest payment, which suggest that educated and associated people want development and 
they are also ready to pay for it in terms of interest payment. In table 7, constant term is 
statistically significant for all variables except ONTR. It suggests that our results may 
improve after incorporation of other variables.  
 
Conclusion 
This study investigates social preference and governance in India. This paper examines the 
relationship between social choice and performance of the governments, and social 
institutions in India during 1990-91 – 2012-13. Social choice is reflected in people’s 
participation in public affairs.  Social capital is a promising concept, which can be defined as 
social network, trust and reciprocity, norms and regulations, etc for smooth functioning of the 
society. It is multidimensional concept but for operational purpose we measure it simply. 
Social trust is a proxy of social capital measuring the level of citizens’ chance to express their 
preferences. So, the government is forced to be responsive to citizens’ preferences and the 
underlying social contract rule, which leads to a higher level of fiscal discipline.  
Our data cover major Indian states over the period 1991-2012. Using principal component 
analysis we construct social capital index that captures both structural and cultural aspects. In 
this study we are focusing on major dimension of social capital such as associational life, 
cultural life etc. Major components of social capital are average associational size, vote 
turnover, literacy and crime rate. Single social capital index is formulated assigning weights, 
which are taken from principal component analysis. Vote turnover is a proxy of social trust 
on institution and it carries higher weight compare to other indicators. 
Our primary observation is that institutional performance index fluctuates and unstable 
during 1991-2012. In the post reform period, the performance of institution declines with 
fluctuation over time. Negative value is associated with crime rate, it is justified because 
more crime rate indicates less trust prevails in the society – it is also indicate the antitrust to 
social development and also reveals the law and order situation or weak governance. Fiscal 
institution in India becomes weak during the said periods. Group of politicians are much 
more interest about their local or regional issues than national issues even they are not 
interested to formulate regional development policy through discussion in the Parliament of 
India.  
Vote turnover rate is highly significant but its impact on revenue collection is different and in 
opposite direction, i.e., own tax revenue falls as vote turnover increases while own nontax 
revenue rises. It indicates that higher social capital reduces own tax revenue. More 
associational life reduces tax revenues whereas literacy rate has positive impact on it. More 
social capital suggests less direct tax burden however more nontax revenues. In state panel 
data set, social capital increases the fiscal deficits which might be used for development 
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activities. Fiscal deficit is actually undesirable in a liberal economy, where fiscal deficit 
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